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Institutionalized Cooperation 
and Resilience in Transboundary 
Freshwater Allocation 
OLIVIA aDaM GREEN AND CHARLES PERRINGS 
Of all the expected impacts of climate change, the most significant is 
likely to be the change in the availability of freshwater associated with 
changing precipitation. The most recent Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) report notes that all regions of the world are 
expected to experience a net negative impact on water resources and 
freshwater ecosystems. The impact is likely to be highly variable, with 
some regions experiencing declining runoff and others experiencing 
increasing runoff. Many areas are projected to experience increased 
variability in precipitation and hence. in water supply, water quality, 
and flood risks (IPCC 2007). Individual countries are already develop-
ing strategies to adapt to or to mitigate the consequences of changes in 
water availability, including the adoption of water conservation mea-
sures and water conservation and adaptive management practices, 
together with the development of novel institutions-including water 
markets. Internationally, however, there are fewer options. Transbound-
ary water resources are typically governed by international treaties and 
by the mechanisms established under those treaties (e.g., transboundary 
water commissions). 
In this chapter, we consider the role of transboundary water agree-
ments in the resilience of social-ecological systems to water shocks and 
stresses, where resilience is taken to mean the capacity of the system 
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to maintain functionality over a particular disturbance regime (Hol-
ling 1973; Perrings 1998). Jransboundary agreements take many forms, 
some being more effective than others at adapting to environmental and 
social change. Two attributes of a social-ecological system determine its 
resilience. One is the adaptive capacity of both components of the sys-
tem (Carpenter et al. 1999; Elmqvist et al. 2003; Scheffer and Carpenter 
2003; Kinzig et al. 2006). For freshwater ecosystems, this depends on the 
flow regimes, sediment and organic inputs, nutrient flows, and biotic 
assemblages (Baron et al. 2002). For the institutions governing trans-
boundary freshwater systems, resilience depends on treaty mechanisms 
that account for fluctuations in the water cycle. A second important 
attribute of coupled systems is their robustness: the properties of the 
system that allow it to accommodate perturbations without additional 
adaptation (Webb and Levin 2005). Using the results of a content analy-
sis, we evaluate these attributes in a sample of seventy-three interna-
tional water treaties. 
Formal management regimes governing shared river basins, as 
designed in international water treaties, are instrumental in mitigating 
potential conflicts and disputes between riparian states and in guiding 
societal interaction with water (Yoffe et al. 2003). Institutions comple-
ment ecosystem services by restricting consumptive use and contami-
nation and through smoothing out variability via infrastructure at their 
disposal. However, analysis of resilience of institutions tends to focus 
on levels of conflict and cooperation over the shared resource, not the 
ecological impact of the management approach. Here, we attempt to 
bridge the divide between what treaty elements promote resilience for 
the institution, as measured by conflict, while also promoting resilience 
in the environment, as measured by the ecosystem's capacity to cope 
with disturbance while maintaining stability. 
First, we give a brief summary of the principles guiding international 
water allocation. Second, three allocation frameworks are discussed and 
evaluated for their capacity to contain risk using the results of a content 
analysis of seventy-three water allocation treaties and how they contrib-
ute to international water-related conflict. Third, other mechanisms for 
treaty design are defined and their application assessed using the results 
of the same survey. Fourth, we discuss how treaties can integrate adap-
tive management principles in order to promote resilience to climatic 
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shocks. We conclude that, to be resilient to environmental change, trea-
ties must incorporate principles that promote institutional capacity to 
manage conflict and iterative governance strategies, most likely through 
establishment of joint water commissions bound to implementing adap-
tive management processes. 
Principles of International Water Law 
Numerous principles guide the development of international water law. 
Each treaty is unique in its application of principles, as each state has 
its own unique set of claims, rights, and needs, and each water body 
displays a unique set of characteristics. The particular mix of treaty provi-
sions has profound implications for its capacity to enhance resilience of 
social-ecological systems (SES). Certain principles favor states based on 
hydrography (upstream versus downstream position), and others tend to 
favor states based on chronology (first to make claim or establish use). 
The constellation of riparians influences levels of cooperation and envi-
ronmental impact. For example, an upstream riparian has little incen-
tive to cooperate, because they can externalize the negative impacts of 
resource exploitation by flushing it all downstream. Thus, in a vacuum, 
upstream states prefer a unilateral order and are reluctant to engage in 
institutionalized cooperation, especially if they derive no benefits from 
downstream states (e.g., transportation, anadromous fish migration). 
Turkey exemplifies this sort of behavi9r along the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin. Conversely, downstream states tend to be more willing to institu-
tionalize cooperation, because they experience the flushed externalities 
of upstream neighbors and therefore want some level of control over the 
resource upstream. For example, countries that have ratified the 1997 
United Nations (UN) Convention on Non-Navigational Use of Inter-
national Watercourses (UN Convention, described later in this chap-
ter) are largely downstream states, such as Iraq. However, this trend 
may not hold true dependent on where power is concentrated in the 
basin. A hegemonic downstream state, such as Egypt on the Nile, is less 
likely to cooperate with its less powerful upstream neighbors, because 
those states may not make enough use of the resource to impact the 
downstream state, and because the more powerful state may be able to 
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limit that use by other means (intimidation; Zeitoun and Warner 2006). 
However, (benign) hegemons may also use their power to create incen-
tives to cooperate, such as South Africa in the Southern African Devel-
opment Community Protocol on Shared Water Resources (Turton and 
Funke 2008). 
The end product usually reflects a compromise between extreme 
positions. Because negotiations are a give-and-take process, extreme 
claims rarely, if ever, take their pure form. Even more, some arguments 
have never been applied and only serve as extreme negotiation posi-
tions (LeMarquand 1976; Matthews 1984). The environmental impact 
of each claim is an important consideration, as some principles facilitate 
resource stewardship, while some arguments encourage unbounded 
exploitation. Below is a brief summary of these concepts and their 
potential environmental consequences. For a more detailed description 
of international water law concepts and their origins, see Dellapenna 
(1995,2001) and Barberis (1991). 
Absolute Territorial Sovereignty 
Absolute territorial sovereignty, commonly referred to as the Harmon 
Doctrine after its founder, U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon, claims 
that a state has an absolute right to all water flowing within its borders. 
This extreme position largely favors upstream claimants and is hydro-
graphical in nature. Because of its grave consequences to downstream 
states and the environment, application of this claim is extremely rare 
and has only been applied in treaties relating to upstream tributaries 
(McCaffrey 1996). Harmon's own successor rejected the theory, and the 
United States eventually repudiated this position in its negotiations with 
Mexico over the Rio Grande (McCaffrey 1996). Still, it lives on as an 
initial position for upstream users and as a rationale for the three non-
signatories of the UN Convention-Turkey, China, and Burundi-that 
are all upstream states. Interestingly, the concept is still argued domes-
tically in the United States. The principle was recently invoked by the 
governor of Georgia in a statement claiming that Georgia was entitled 
to use all the water that falls within its borders, despite the U.S. Supreme 
Court's rejection of the principle when Colorado invoked it for greater 
180 INS TIT UTI 0 N A LI ZED COO PER A T ION AND RES I LI ENe E 
rights to the Arkansas River against Kansas in 1902 (Kansas v. Colorado 
1902; Gleick 2009). 
With respect to the environment, pure application of the Harmon 
Doctrine could be devastating. Granting a state the right to divert all 
water within its territory creates exploitation incentives void of any 
incentive to conserve and could dry up the entire resource. For .exam-
pIe, the u.s. state of Georgia, the upstream state on the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint river system has been embroiled in controversial 
litigation recently with its downstream states, Alabama and Florida. 
Georgia claims an absolute right to use all the water that flows within its 
borders. Alabama and Florida claim that Georgia's overuse has reduced 
instream flows and contaminated the system to a point that has deci-
mated endangered downstream estuarine fisheries, especially shellfish 
beds (Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2002; In re Tri-State 
Water Rights Litigation 2011). 
Absolute Riverain Integrity 
Absolute riverain integrity, also referred to as absolute territorial integ-
rity, is the contrasting and equally extreme argument of international 
water law. States invoking this argument claim that each riparian has 
a right to the natural unobstructed flow of a river as it runs through 
its territory. This argument largely favors downstream states in humid 
climates and is hydrographical. Upstre~m states are prevented from 
diverting and consuming any flow, because the farthest downstream 
state is entitled to enjoy the entire flow. However, because the farthest 
downstream state has no obligation to another downstream state, they 
may be entitled to dewater. Much like the Harmon Doctrine, this argu-
ment is not integrated into treaties in practice and serves mostly as a 
strong initial position for negotiations (Odom and Wolf 2011). 
The environmental impact of applying this principle may seem 
minimal, but restrictions against diverting flow may not curb instream 
development or restrict any consumption or development of the far-
thest downstream state. In addition, an upstream state may be entitled 
to install run-of-the-river hydropower dams that do not divert water 
but impede aquatic migration and alter sedImentation patterns, among 
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other effects. Likewise, upstream states may not be required to prevent 
contamination as long as the volume of flow is unaltered. 
Limited Territorial Sovereignty 
Limited territorial sovereignty, a hybrid of the extreme claims, provides 
for balanced use of a water body restricted by principles of equity (Le., 
one state's use does not cause significant harm to another state's rea-
sonable use). This doctrine is guided by vague principles catalogued in 
many international conventions, namely the UN Convention and the 
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, and 
many of the factors are discussed below. 
The UN Convention, adopted in 1997 by the UN General Assembly, 
specifically focuses on international transboundary water resources. 
The UN Convention codifies many of the principles deemed essential 
by the international community for the management of shared water 
resources, such as equitable and reasonable utilization of waters with 
specific attention to vital human needs, protection of the aquatic envi-
ronment, and the promotion of cooperative management mechanisms. 
The convention also incorporates provisions concerning data and infor-
mation exchange and mechanisms for conflict resolution. Once ratified, 
the UN Convention will oblige a legally binding framework, at least 
upon its signatories, for managing international watercourses. Even 
without ratification, its guidelines are being increasingly invoked in 
trans boundary negotiations in which its general concepts are bolstered 
by basin-specific details to govern a particular watercourse. 
Adopted by the International Law Association in 1966, the Helsinki 
Rules describe guidelines on how international surface waters and 
groundwater should be used. The Helsinki Rules led to the Berlin Rules 
on Water Resources of 2004, which address all freshwater resources (not 
limited to international waters). Both sets of rules emphasize sustainable 
management practices that minimize environmental harm. Interpreta-
tion of factors and the relative weight assigned to each varies depen-
dent on the parties. Hydrohegemony scholars argue that the vagueness 
of these factors gives too much leeway for the more powerful states 
to grant disproportionate weight to those factors that favor themselves 
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(Zeitoun and Warner 2006). However, an equitable distribution of water 
requires that institutions not operate in favor of any particular state. 
Guiding principles include equity in interpretation of law, restric-
tions on use to benefit other states, reciprocity in adherence to agree-
ments, and peaceful dispute resolution. These principles guide water 
allocations based on equitable and reasonable use, the obligation to not 
cause harm, and past use (historic rights), but vague and occasionally 
contradictory language results in varied and conflicting interpretations 
of the principles (Biswas 1999). Each principle and its environmental 
impact is described below. 
EQUITABLE AND REASONABLE USE 
Equitable and reasonable use is a principle of customary international 
law accompanied by a long list of factors to determine what is equi-
table or reasonable. Its general acceptability stems from its vagueness. 
The UN Convention and the Helsinki Rules provide guidance on how 
the principle is to be implemented. Relevant factors, such as level of 
harm and demand, are identified and calculated, and the conclusion is 
reached on the basis of the sum or a cost-benefit analysis. Environ-
mentally, this approach depends on the threshold of allowable harm or 
what level of harm is deemed "reasonable:' Typically, use is limited by an 
obligation to not prevent another state from enjoying its equitable use 
of the resource, discussed below. 
OBLIGATION TO NOT CAUSE HARM 
The obligation to not cause harm is normally qualified as the obligation to 
avoid significant harm and holds that riparian users must take all appro-
priate action to prevent causing significant harm to other riparian users, 
not necessarily the environment. Legitimate water projects that might 
negatively impact other riparian states and their development potential 
may be enjoined by this principle. Some scholars attribute its contro-
versial implications as the reason the UN Convention has not been rati-
fied (McCaffrey 2001). Typically, upstream states oppose this provision; 
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however, harm does not only flow downstream. A downstream state 
may cause significant harm to an upstream state by development proj-
ects that restrict upstream migration of anadromous species, impound 
flow, impact navigation, or cut off future plans for upstream development 
because that future development may harm the downstream project. 
Environmentally, restriction on harming the environment seems to 
promote environmental integrity. However, what counts as harm turns 
on the interpretation of significant harm and on the parties' values. Envi-
ronmental harm may not be of great concern, and thus, environmental 
degradation would not constitute a significant harm to be avoided. 
HISTORIC RIGHTS 
Historic rights grant priority to existing uses over proposed uses. Chro-
nology is key. Prior uses are usually deemed inherently superior to pro-
posed uses and granted the volume necessary to continue. This likely 
stems from the defensibility of prior uses as an expression of need, espe-
cially when protecting native rights. Downstream states in arid or exotic 
watersheds often invoke this principle in order to defend infrastructure. 
For example, Egypt has a long history of development on the Nile com-
pared with the relatively recent projects begun upstream. 
Environmentally, this approach can be harmful, because no regard is 
paid to the type of use, impacts, or benefits. While upstream develop-
ment may be curbed in order to protect pre-existing downstream proj-
ects or uses, this doctrine also creates a strong incentive to develop first 
and fast. There is no incentive to cooperate on joint projects, which 
tend to take longer to build up. Instead, each state may develop similar 
projects, whereas a joint project with benefit sharing would have had 
less impact on the environment. In addition, strict adherence to priority 
by date leaves no room for changed values over time (Wilkinson 1989). 
Prioritization of Uses 
Prioritization of uses sets up a hierarchy of uses with those serving vital 
human needs above all others. Agriculture, energy production, and 
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industrial uses usually follow domestic use, depending on the weight 
given to certain hydrographic and sociopolitical factors and the val-
ues of the region. For example, the two sets of boundary waters agree-
ments between the United States and Canada, and the United States and 
Mexico prioritize differently, due to the amount of water available along 
each border region and the dominant uses in the region: the former 
prioritizes first domestic and sanitary, then navigation, electricity gen-
eration, and irrigation; the latter gives descending weight to domestic, 
agriculture, electric power, other industry, navigation, fishing, and other 
beneficial uses. 
Environmental concerns and instream flows may be included in the 
priority list, on par with environmentally harmful uses, but priority 
to instream use is rare. Generally, uses with the worst environmental 
record come after those with less harmful effects (domestic). However, 
relatively intensive uses, such as industrial and agricultural, are usually 
granted medium to high priority. The relatively low priority granted to 
environmental use is a reflection of the relatively recent change in soci-
etal values regarding instream flow. 
Allocation Frameworks 
Water allocation frameworks generally reflect (1) the rights of each 
party; (2) the wants and needs of each party; and (3) in some cases, 
an evaluation of benefits to be shared. ~ome treaties consist of a mix . 
of the first two approaches, with some allocations based on territorial 
entitlements and others granted based on existing uses or other mea-
surements of need. The third category may also influence the allocation 
scheme but requires a paradigm shift from the rights-based mental-
ity, as political boundaries are lifted and parties become citizens of the 
watershed. Depending on how rights, needs, or benefits are defined, and 
how nature is valued and assessed, each allocation approach may fall 
anywhere along the resilience spectrum. 
A content analysis was conducted using the Transboundary Freshwa-
ter Dispute Database (TFDD) of water-related treaties and events. The 
database is housed at Oregon State University under the direction of Dr. 
Aaron T. Wolf and is widely considered to be the most comprehensive 
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collection of water treaties, water-related events, and geospatial data of 
trans boundary water resources. The full results of this survey, including 
detailed statistical analysis, are published in Dinar et al. (2010). 
Entitlement-Focused Negotiation 
Sovereigns argue over entitlements based on relative riparian position 
or past use. Claims based on absolute principles may seem easy to cal-
culate, as they would constitute 100 percent of flow, either to be used 
as water flowing within borders as absolute territorial integrity dictates 
or to be kept in stream as absolute riverain integrity requires. However, 
claims based on extreme principles are politically impossible to mea-
sure. As discussed above, the absolute principles rarely form the basis 
of an allocation, so the relative ease of calculation is negated by the dif-
ficulty in persuading the other side to grant full allocation of a stream. 
Thus, any allocation based on rights is necessarily tempered from the 
absolute. 
Institutions that allocate based on property rights tend to generate 
less conflict, but also are less adaptive to changing conditions. India and 
Pakistan, for example, divide the tributaries of the Indus River accord-
ing to territory, as agreed in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between 
Pakistan and India, brokered by International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank). India is entitled to 100 percent of the 
eastern tributaries; Pakistan enjoys unrestricted use of 100 percent of 
the western tributaries, and India agrees to allow those western tribu-
taries to flow unimpeded through Indian territory (with some minor 
exceptions). Scholars note the resilience of this institution by pointing 
out that the terms were honored in the midst of armed conflict (Kirmani 
1990; Alam 2002). However, as the international community trends 
toward integrated watershed management and catastrophic flooding in 
Pakistan in 2010 spurred calls for increased storage upstream (Kiani 
2011), this rigid allocation scheme hinders the institution's ability to 
adjust to changed values and demand. See, for example, the difficulty 
in agreeing on development of the Kishanganga Dam. The states could 
not agree on the construction of a hydropower facility on a western 
tributary in India, invoking the intervention of the International Court 
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of Arbitration, which recently enjoined the project (The Nation 2008, 
2011). Indian development plans also commonly prompt accusations 
of violative flow impoundment, especially during drought (Jamil 2008). 
Ecologically, decades of relative peace over the Indus River led to 
many large-scale developments in a river valley already known for its 
vast network of canals. Without any environmental protection provi-
sions, both states have been free to utilize their full entitlements, which 
are 100 percent of flow. Dewatering, contamination, and instream infra-
structure has led to ecological collapse, including endangerment of the 
charismatic Indus River dolphin (Reeves et al. 1991; Braulik 2006). In 
this instance, an institution capable of containing the level of conflict/ 
number of grievances expressed has nevertheless led to a loss of eco-
logical resilience. 
Need (Current UseJ-Based Allocation 
Need-based or current use-based allocation is the most common 
approach applied in international negotiations. Of the water alloca-
tion agreements that explain why water is to be allocated a certain way 
(fifty treaties of a sample of seventy-three treaties), most base alloca-
tions on current use (mostly for irrigation, domestic uses, and hydro-
power generation) and project that use based on growth predictions. 
Current use is the more sensible unit of measurement once negotiators 
have moved past abstract absolute rights, .because it can be concretely 
measured based on irrigable acreage, population, use, environmental 
requirement, or any other mutually agreeable parameter. Historic uses 
are typically granted the necessary water to continue, because they are 
simple to quantify. This approach may include a discussion of priorities, 
beneficial and reasonable use, environmental harm, and equity. 
The resilience of need-based allocation mechanisms depends on the 
characterization and prioritization of need and the inclusion of adapt-
ability mechanisms (discussed below). Calculations limited to irrigable 
acreage or population are vulnerable against even foreseeable changes 
in population and demand, and exhibit much less resilience with respect 
to less predictable disturbances, such as climate change, natural disaster, 
epidemic, or regulation (e.g., species protection that requires increased 
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instream flow a la the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973). Content 
analysis of the water allocation data set reveals that most need-based 
treaties are not so rigid as to require an allocation made based on a 
certain need to be used strictly for that purpose. Need is typically used 
to quantify the distribution, and once the distribution is agreed upon, 
the states have flexibility in utilization, within reason. For example, the 
treaty governing the Incomati/Inkomati River between Swaziland and 
South Africa allocates a specific amount for afforestation in both states 
based on the amount of land to be planted, a rare nod to environmental 
need in a water treaty. Using that water for any purpose other than affor-
estation would violate the spirit and terms of the allocation provision. 
On the other hand, an allocation based on population and per capita 
consumption would not necessarily be violated if the allocation is dis-
tributed among other uses. 
Benefit Sharing 
Benefit sharing requires that the basin be managed as a single unit, the 
aggregate benefits then being distributed to each country according to 
some negotiated principle of proportionality. Such an approach shifts 
the analysis from the resource itself to the benefits of utilization. Thus, 
the product to be shared or allocated expands beyond water to include 
goods and commodities, such as agricultural products, hydroelectricity, 
and, conceivably, benefits from nonuse; such as conservation, in stream 
flows, and improved water quality (Sadoff and Grey 2002). 
Consider the following example. By lifting the border between the 
upstream and downstream states, water managers can collaborate on 
the optimal location for a reservoir. Consider a downstream state that 
experiences frequent flooding and seeks to construct a reservoir, but 
the state's territory is mostly floodplain, so any reservoir would be shal-
low, have a large footprint, and store less water than a reservoir with a 
smaller footprint in a deep valley in the headwaters. In addition, down-
stream development would impede the migration of anadromous fish. 
At the same time, a canyon in an upstream state may be a more suitable 
location for a storage facility that would benefit the downstream state 
in the form of flood protection without imposing downstream physical 
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barriers to fish migration. Upstream development would also cause sig-
nificant environmental harm, harm which must be addressed if the SES 
is to be resilient. The upstream facility may be able to provide greater 
benefit (Le., store more water) with potentially less cost (Le., flooded 
land and evaporation). Then, whatever benefits the downstream state 
reaps can be paid forward to the upstream state, perhaps in collabora-
tive measures to protect upstream migration or as financial side pay-
ments. For instance, as part of the Columbia River Treaty, the United 
States pays Canada for the benefits of flood control and Canada diverts 
water between the Columbia and Kootenai for hydropower purposes as 
part of a larger scheme of sharing hydropower benefits, whereby Can-
ada releases water for hydropower production in the United States. Half 
of the electricity is either delivered to Canada, or the United States pays 
Canada for its value (Wolf 1999). 
The assumption that the benefits of river basin management are 
shared between countries implies a cooperative approach on the part 
of participating countries. The conditions in which countries will coop-
erate are quite limited, as are conditions in which international agree-
ments are self-enforcing (Barrett 2003; Wu and Whittington 2006; 
Touza and Perrings 2011). Where they exist, however, self-enforcement 
mechanisms have been shown to correlate with a reduction in conflict 
over the resource (Dinar et al. 2010). Integration of various elements 
of water resource planning across multiple scales, known as integrated 
water resource management, tends to be decentralized and more legit-
imate, as it incorporates an array of sta~eholder interests (Blomquist 
et al. 2005). However, recent research has shown that integrated water 
resource management may be at odds with the flexibility required of 
adaptive management practices (Engle et al. 2011) (but see Chapters 4 
and 5, this volume). Of water quantity-related treaties (a broader group 
than those that outline allocations), ten move beyond needs and discuss 
sharing benefits from and beyond the river in an equitable allocation of 
water, hydraulic development, reforestation, flood control, capital, and 
other commodities-their "basket of benefits" or "benefit-shed:' Gover-
nance of the Aral Sea is a prime example. 
The 1998 treaty over the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade Reservoirs in 
the Aral Sea basin reflects the heterogeneous distribution of natural 
resources in the region and attempts to share them equitably through 
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integrating regional fuel, energy, agriculture, and water economies. The 
Naryn River originates in the Tian Shan Mountains of Kyrgysztan, where 
opportunities for storage and hydropower generation are greater than 
in the broader, downstream valleys of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
where cotton production is vital to the regional economy. Kyrgysztan 
and Tajikistan store water over the winter and forgo potential hydro-
power generation from winter releases in order to provide Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan with a dependable source of irrigation in the grow-
ing season. In exchange for the agricultural and flood control ben-
efits provided from the storage and release of water from Kyrgyzstan's 
Toktogul Reservoir (the largest storage facility on the Naryn River) 
and electricity provided from hydropower generation in the growing 
season, Uzbekistan provides electric power, natural gas, and fuel oil, 
while Kazakhstan provides electric power and thousands of tons of 
coal to Kyrgyzstan during the season of storage. Additionally, Kyrgyz-
stan agrees to reduce its national energy consumption by 10 percent 
in order to reduce demand on the energy sector. Tajikistan was later 
added in an effort to create a single economic zone addressed to water 
and energy issues in 1999. 
Although many may still question the resilience of the current 
resource allocation in the area, the institution is a marked improvement 
from the nonintegrated, independent exploitation and historic Soviet 
misuse. The collapse of the Aral Sea, one of the world's most shock-
ing man-made environmental disasters, decimated the region in both 
ecological and economic terms. Integrated development has tempered 
the dewatering, and the self-enforcing aspects of the arrangement con-
stitute institutionalized cooperation between states. States continue to 
disagree over development projects and impacts (The Telegraph 2010), 
but the presence of the treaty has increased the institutional capacity of 
the states to cope with change and conflict (Yoffe et al. 2003). In addition, 
the physical Aral may be better off, because increased storage in winter 
may keep more water instream during irrigation season. Increased fossil 
fuel consumption in lieu of hydropower production may tip the envi-
ronmental footprint of this arrangement into a less stable state (albeit 
hydropower has its own set of impacts that can erode resilience), but 
the agreed 10 percent consumption reduction signals some degree of 
conservation awareness. 
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Resilient Treaty Design 
The unique hydrology, climate, economics, and politics of each inter-
national basin preclude blueprints for building resilient institutions, 
and each water treaty comprises a unique set of provisions to govern 
the resource. Water can be distributed in many different ways, some 
simple, some complex, some resilient, some not. Management regimes 
can be iterative, information shared, conflicts foreseen, extreme events 
planned for, systems monitored, and joint commissions formed. Or not. 
Treaty design, not the mere presence of a treaty, is paramount to the 
stability of the institution (Dinar et al. 2010). 
While blueprints may not exist, patterns emerge indicating that 
assemblage of certain provisions correlate with institutional resilience 
and adaptive capacity (Dinar et al. 2010). An institution's adaptive capac-
ity can be forecast by the presence of certain provisions and, equally 
important, the institution's ability to effectively mobilize these mecha-
nisms in response to disturbance (Adger et al. 2011). Adaptive capacity 
provisions require resources such as information, learning capacity, and 
human and social capital, all of which may be accounted for in treaty 
design (Tol and Yohe 2007). 
Since 1820, more than 450 water treaties and other water-related 
agreements have been signed, more than half of which were con-
cluded after 1950. Despite growth in treaty formation and increased 
calls for resilience, a review of treaties from the last sixty years 
reveals an overall lack of mechanisms de~igned to enhance resilience 
to water shocks. For example, states rarely explicitly delineate water 
allocations, the most conflictive and volatile issue area between co-
riparian states (Giordano and Wolf 2003). Further, the treaties that 
do specify quantities often do by fixed volumes, ignoring dynamic 
hydrology, values, and needs. Likewise, water quality provisions play 
a minor role in co-riparian agreements historically (Giordano 2003). 
Enforcement mechanisms are also absent in a large percentage of 
the treaties. Thus, even if a treaty acknowledges the need to be resil-
ient facing variable water availability, there may not be any means of 
ensuring each state will respond to disturbance according to treaty 
principles. 
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Water Allocation Method 
The method of water allocation embodied in a treaty has profound 
implications for the resilience of the social-ecological system served by 
the treaty to both climatic and other shocks (Dinar et al. 2010; Odom 
and Wolf 2011). States share water by many means, often as a reflec-
tion of the negotiation process and historic relations, and the degree to 
which the environment is considered varies greatly. Methods of alloca-
tion vary from simple volumes to a complex calculus of flows, avail-
ability, and time of year. Disturbingly, the treaty record is replete with 
allocations that do not allow for the vagaries of nature and the scientific 
unknown and that often lead to tense political standoffs and environ-
mental degradation. 
Most commonly, states divide water based on fixed volumes, the 
least adaptive form of allocation. Rigid entitlements leave no flexibility 
to account for hydrologic variability, and the IPCC predicts such rigidity 
will lead to increased international tension: 
One major implication of climate change for agreements between 
competing users (within a region or upstream versus downstream) is 
that allocating rights in absolute terms may lead to further disputes in 
years to come when the total absolute amount of water available may 
be different. (McCarthy et al. 2001, 225) 
In low-water years, if states divert their full entitlement, water levels 
fall, perhaps to the point of dewatering, and strain the aquatic ecosys-
tem. Another likely drought scenario challenges institutional resilience 
when an upstream state diverts its full allotment, leaving insufficient 
flow for the downstream state to satisfy its entitlement. Without flex-
ibility in allotments or flow requirements at some downstream point 
(e.g., the upper basin states of the Colorado River must release enough 
water from Glen Canyon Dam so that 7.5 MAF /year flows to the lower 
basin at Lees Ferry), allocation by strict volume leads to vulnerability in 
institutions and social-ecological systems. 
Of the sample of water allocation treaties (n = 73), twenty-eight trea-
ties allocated water based on fixed quantities, with sixteen of those not 
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providing flexibility in the allocation mechanism. Of the twelve remain-
ing treaties, nine acknowledge variability and base the fixed quantity on 
availability. For example, the 1994 treaty between Lebanon and Syria 
over the Al-Asi River (Orontes) provides 80 MCM to Lebanon when the 
amount of water in Lebanon is 400 MCM or greater. When the annual 
quantity falls below 400 MCM, the year is considered "rainless;' and the 
Lebanese share is reduced by 20 percent. The remaining three treaties 
in the data set allocate fixed quantities that may be recouped over a par-
ticular period of time. The adaptability of this method depends in part 
on the period of time. In low-water periods, recoupment over a course 
of days does not account for seasonal variation. In prolonged drought, 
more generous recoupment periods of several years may still result in 
failure to meet treaty obligations. 
Agreements that reduce diversions during low-water years provide 
for more adaptable institutions and are less likely to dewater a stream. 
However, states must agree on what constitutes a low-water year and 
utilize accurate assessment methods (Kilgour and Dinar 2001). For 
example, the dry season immediately after the 1996 treaty between Ban-
gladesh and India over the Ganges River, a treaty that allocates quanti-
ties and percentages according to the water level at Farakka Barrage 
and took 35 years to negotiate, the water level fell below the minimum 
accounted for in the treaty, partly due to the data used to establish mini-
mum flows, and the institution was strained. The parties used historical 
hydrological data that did not account for increased upstream diver-
sions or changing climate patterns. As' a r~sult, the institution faltered, 
and Bangladesh, the downstream state, faced water scarcity. By relying 
on historical data and past trends to predict future patterns, the institu-
tion failed to appreciate the complexity of the social-ecological system 
along with its tipping points (Liu et al. 2007; Lenton 2011). 
Most treaties (55 percent or forty out of seventy-three) allocate 
based on fixed quantities, percentages, or both. Percentages account for 
changes in availability due to physical or social disturbance, and unless 
the entire flow is allocated to states (e.g., 50/50), grant proportional 
protection to instream flow. Whether that protection is adequate to 
support a resilient social-ecological system depends on hydrology and 
the reserved amount. If 30 percent of flow is reserved instream, that 
may not be adequate for habitat, even in a wet year. On the other hand, 
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leaving 100 percent of flow instream may not be sufficient in a severe 
drought. Institutionally, allocation by percentage is less likely to lead to 
state grievances (Dinar et al. 2010). 
Extreme Events Provision 
While the resilience of a system is measured by its ability to cope with 
change (Yoffe et al. 2003), water allocation treaties regularly ignore the 
inevitability of extreme events, especially drought, despite research 
demonstrating that the intensity of state grievances is robustly corre-
lated with the degree of flow variability in the basin (Dinar et al. 2010). 
Extreme fluctuations in flow variability can be built into the allocation 
mechanism or dealt with in separate provisions or through separate 
treaties. Only twelve treaties in the TFDD collection of water quantity, 
flood protection, and hydropower treaties (n = 102) contain drought 
adaptability mechanisms. These mechanisms range from vague provi-
sions to consult and cooperate in the event of drought (e.g., Agreement 
between the Governments of the Republic of Portugal, the People's 
Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa Relative to 
the Cahora Bassa Project, signed May 2,1984) to more specific pledges 
to cease all irrigation pumping if flow falls below certain levels (e.g., 
Complementary Settlement to the Agreement of Cooperation between 
the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Brazil for the Use of Natural Resources 
and the Development of the Cuareim River Basin, signed May 6, 1997). 
Presence of an adaptability mechanism to drought has been shown to 
affect the intensity of state grievances (Dinar et al. 2010). Notably absent 
are provisions to protect the environment in times of drought. 
Floods that cross boundaries tend to account for a disproportionate 
share of casualties and are more severe in magnitude of loss (Bakker 
2009a). Many treaties in the TFDD collection concern flood control, 
mostly in the form of joint infrastructure projects (e.g., reservoirs, 
levees, river straightening), and these treaties tend to be single-issue 
agreements that outline specifics of flood control mechanisms, not 
vague references. However, agreement over flood control mechanisms 
does not robustly correlate with fewer state grievances (Dinar et al. 
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2010). In addition, Bakker (2009a) found that international river basins 
with water institutions experienced higher flood magnitudes than those 
basins without institutions. 
Data Sharing, Joint Monitoring, and Information Exchange 
Monitoring and data sharing is crucial for iterative governance of a 
dynamic resource. In contentious basins, agreements to exchange data 
can be the first step in building a cooperative governance structure 
(Sadoff et al. 2008). When ecosystem knowledge is shared among a 
variety of stakeholders, institutions enable responsive and flexible solu-
tions at the appropriate scale (Brown 2002). To ward off the tendency 
to "hunker down;' whereby states are less willing to share information 
when facing disturbance, the agreement to share must be institutional-
ized (Anderies et al. 2004; Putnam 2007). 
Unfortunately, though many treaties include monitoring and data-
sharing provisions, information sharing among states is relatively low 
(Grossman 2006). Whether caused by a lack of monitoring or technol-
ogy, incompatibility between databases, or a lack of willingness to share, 
restricted data sharing has exacerbated the ecosystem harm of water sys-
tem infrastructure, such as the effect of dams on the Senegal River (Gross-
man 2006). The Senegal River is managed by a joint commission that is 
responsible for operating a database of flow information. One contribut-
ing factor to the data-related problems of ~e Senegal is that an upstream 
riparian, Guinea, is not a member of the joint commission and does not 
contribute inflow data, resulting in data gaps. Data gaps weakened the 
capacity of dam operation models to optimize both water allocations and 
environmental health as designed. As a result, additional agreements are 
necessary to define the roles of all contributing organizations and to cre-
ate a central river basin information system (Grossman 2006). 
Joint Commission 
Recognizing the restraints of the negotiation process, treaties often 
establish joint commissions to manage shared resources. Of the world's 
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276 transboundary river basins, 78 are represented by an international 
commission and even within these, few include all nations riparian to 
the affected basins, precluding the integrated basin-wide management 
advocated by the international community (Bakker 2009b). The scale of 
operations ranges from day-to-day decisions concerning operation of 
infrastructure to occasional discussion of new development projects. 
In some cases, joint commissions enjoy some degree of independence 
from their respective national governments and may be less bound by 
political relations and realities. For example, the Joint Water Commit-
tee, established by the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace to resolve conflict 
without amending the treaty, to monitor water quality, and to share data, 
mitigated a rhetorically heated conflict between the riparian states dur-
ing the severe drought of 1998-1999 by modifying allocations (Odom 
and Wolf 2011). The treaty provides for Jordanian water storage (winter) 
and release (summer) in the Sea of Galilee/Kinneret/Lake Tiberias/Lake 
of Gennesaret system, which lies completely within Israel. In return, 
Israel secured fifty-year leases for wells and agricultural land in Jordan. 
The treaty also allocates fixed volumes of the Jordan and Yarmouk Riv-
ers. When Israel threatened to renege on its delivery schedule, protests 
erupted in Amman and the King ofJordan issued harsh words, challeng-
ing the stability of peace between the nations. The treaty was silent with 
respect to flow variability, especially such extreme fluctuations as those 
experienced during a drought. Likewise, the Joint Water Committee did 
not have expressed authority to modify allocations. Nonetheless, the 
committee intervened to mitigate the conflict, exhibiting institutional 
capacity to manage the disturbance (Odom and Wolf 2011). 
International river management organizations that attempt to tackle 
multiple collective-action problems, such as environmental conserva-
tion and water allocation, face increased challenges to their effective-
ness, but many argue that integration of all related problems is necessary 
for effective governance (Kliot et al. 2001; Dombrowsky 2007; Sadoff et 
al. 2008). Thus, an organization that focuses solely on how to allocate 
water and has no jurisdiction to mitigate or even monitor environmen-
tal impacts of withdrawals can only be effective to a limited extent. Con-
ceivably (and perhaps even likely), withdrawals made without concern 
for environmental harm will decimate the source and render the organi-
zation ineffective. If addressing multiple issues reduces the effectiveness 
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of an organization but a singular focus leads to exacerbation of related 
problems, there must be a trade-off made whereby the most important 
related problems, such as sustainability and ecosystem resilience, are 
addressed along with resource distribution (Schmeier 2010). 
Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
If all other treaty mechanisms fail to avoid conflict, a previously agreed 
upon method of dispute resolution will, at the very least, provide some 
guarantee of cooperation. How dispute resolution influences the effec-
tiveness of an institution varies by basin and method. Disputes may be 
solved by consultation, arbitration through a neutral third party (e.g., 
UN, World Bank, International Court of Arbitration/Justice), diplomatic 
channels, or a joint commission, among other means. This mechanism 
may act as a fail-safe against defection and may provide states with at 
least a minimal incentive to cooperate, depending on where a dispute 
may ultimately be settled. For example, if a state is only bound to vague 
commitments to resolve conflict diplomatically, they may stall or act 
uncooperatively with little penalty. On the other hand, if disputes are to 
be settled on the world stage by a neutral arbitrator, the stakes for acting 
in bad faith may be higher. 
Treaties to Promote Resilience in ~ocial-Ecological Systems 
Since the 1992 UN Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment proclaimed twenty-seven principles to guide sustainable develop-
ment, states have increasingly incorporated environmental protection 
into treaties, but many of the recent environmentally conscious trea-
ties merely establish a spirit of cooperation over ecosystem protection 
without obligating riparians to fulfill any specific ecological threshold or 
dictating any particular process for protection or monitoring. 
Of the water quantity-related treaties in the TFDD collection, eleven 
include explicit provisions for environmental protection, and eight of 
these were signed in the past twenty years. These treaties have the pri-
mary purpose of either allocating water or establishing a framework to 
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allocate water while protecting ecosystems. In our survey of water allo-
cation mechanisms, only three treaties justified allocations for environ-
mental reasons, compared with twenty-three (32 percent) that gave no 
justification, and thirteen (18 percent) and eleven (15 percent) that justi-
fied allocations for irrigation and hydropower, respectively. For exam-
ple, the 1992 agreement between South Africa and Swaziland over the 
Incomati/Inkomati allocates fixed quantities of water that vary accord-
ing to availability, with additional allocations reserved for afforestation 
based on the area of land to be planted. It should be noted that the envi-
ronmentally related justification is for only one aspect of the allocation. 
It follows that adaptive management principles in international 
agreements are required if they are to accommodate the effects of 
changing climate on variability in water availability. However, few trea-
ties actually spell out iterative processes (Wolf 2007; Drieschova et al. 
2008, 2011; Eckstein 2010). Political difficulties prevent treaties them-
selves from being iterative. While open, negotiations may go back and 
forth, and there may be room for iterative give and take as information 
is exchanged. However, once closed, treaties may be effectively locked 
until they expire, often a period of decades. Another challenge for inte-
grating adaptive management practices would be convincing state water 
ministers to leave room for flexibility and error in the management of 
a vital resource. Given the scrutiny under which negotiations proceed, 
negotiators would likely prefer to leave experimentation in the hands 
of the trusted technocrats they appoint (Arvai et al. 2006; Gregory et 
al. 2006). Thus, for iterative processes to influence governance of inter-
national watercourses, the process must be built into the organization 
established to jointly manage the resource. Mechanisms such as moni-
toring and information sharing must be institutionalized to bind the 
river basin organization to these procedures. 
Unlike U.S. administrative law, which requires detailed front-end pro-
cedures, treaties are typically brief and lack long descriptions of process. 
Instead, they often establish a joint management commission that could 
(at least in theory) be mandated to operate according to resilience prin-
ciples. This would require the regulatory structure to be adaptive-to 
be an experimentation-based learning process consisting of continuous 
monitoring of the transboundary water body (Le., the social-ecological 
system), data review, and the regulatory adjustments needed to promote 
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the desired goal, all at the appropriate scale (Ruhl 2005; Bruch 2009). 
Many of these principles, such as data accumulation, information shar-
ing, and cooperative management are not foreign to the international 
water community. By mandating an adaptive management approach 
through monitoring, assessment, and adjustment provisions, treaties 
may increase their institutional capacity to cope with societal and eco-
logical change. 
Modern technology, especially information-gathering technolo-
gies such as those prescribed in iterative approaches, can change the 
law. International water law scholar Joseph Dellapenna contends that 
technology changes the problems international law must address, the 
range of solutions, and the intellectual structures of international legal 
institutions (Dellapenna 2000). Institutionalizing adaptive management 
techniques may change the law by identifying new problems posed 
by international water development, as data accumulation may reveal 
a problem in water development that was previously unknown, pres-
ent new solutions as continuous experimentation results in surprising 
results, and change the structure of treaties as joint commissions are 
structured to operate based on iterative processes. 
Conclusion 
To manage a transboundary water body for resilience in a social-
ecological system, an institution must be capable of coping with change. 
There is no ideal model for this. However, certain principles have been 
shown to reduce conflict over shared natural resources-flexible alloca-
tions that reflect the v:;lriability of availability, joint commissions that 
cooperatively manage the resource, dispute resolution mechanisms that 
give certainty to the process of conflict, and provisions that proactively 
determine operational adjustments in times of extreme disturbance and 
stress. These provisions and their application vary in how they protect 
the environment, and environmental protection should not be traded 
away for institutional stability. 
As such, institutions must be designed to cope with or reduce con-
flict, while also maintaining ecological integrity. After all, what good is 
a peaceful water organization that has no water to manage? To this end, 
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collaborative management should integrate iterative processes so that as 
social and ecological systems alter one another, they also co evolve into 
more resilient regimes. 
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